Artificial-intelligence systems such as large language models (LLMs) can exhibit behaviour that seems strikingly intelligent. This has led many people, including some experts, to wonder whether these systems could have some form of consciousness — the capacity for subjective experience. However, we think that existing AI systems are not conscious, and that, along current trajectories of development, they are not likely to become conscious. Greater clarity about whether AI could become consciousness will be crucial as society grapples with the challenges posed by this increasingly powerful technology.
It’s a computer program and some data - nothing more.
I’ll happily treat it anyway I see fit at the time - including powering it off without loosing any sleep over it.
It’s a silly argument.
LLMs are designed to mimic smart humans. Any test devised to find the dividing line will fail because at some point there will be a pretty large group of humans that would fail that test.
Meaning that we need a definition of consciousness that can’t be mimicked by text or voice alone, and isn’t going to exclude people who are just naturally unintelligent.
Case in point, some days of the week, the elected - elected! - head of state of a major county couldn’t pass a Turing test. You expect the people that voted for him to pass that test any day of the week?
The test ought to be using observation of a quantum state. Can a 50 IQ human observe something thet collapses the wave form? Yeah. Don’t take skills to observe. Great, now see if an LLM can do that.
It isn’t just a problem of needing a definition of consciousness that meets certain criteria. That’s actually kind of backwards. We need to discover what the shit we’re actually talking about when we refer to consciousness. Is it a thing, a process, … do birds have it? Insects? Worms?
We’ve all pretty much decided that consciousness definitely exists in some form. It isn’t honest to just define it as whatever conveniently fits our desired narrative. So “defining” isn’t really what needs to happen. “Qualifying” is what needs to happen.
To me, that is backwards. No one applies the same logic anywhere else. Can you think of any other situation whereby we insist some word, let’s call it Florgleblorp, has true meaning, even though none of us can define Florgleblorp, and that we need to do further scientific research and discovery in order to learn how to properly define Florgleblorp?
It’s just strange to me. We invent terms to describe things that we already know exist, we don’t start with terms that contain no meaning and then go out in search for meaning. That is bizarre.
Well, that’s sort of strawmanning my argument isn’t it?
I started with the disclosure that we all believe consciousness exists in some form. That alone separates my argument from your example: consciousness exists, Florgleblorp doesn’t. If you alternatively want to argue that consciousness doesn’t exist, that’s another conversation I’m willing to have.
Consciousness isn’t some arbitrary word we’ve invented and subsequently gone searching for a referent. We already have the phenomenon we’re attempting to explain: subjective experience. What we lack is a sufficiently established understanding of what constitutes it, how it arises, and how to reliably identify it in other systems.
That’s how scientific investigation frequently works. We recognize phenomena before we fully understand their mechanisms or develop reliable criteria for identifying them.
Of course we need provisional definitions to investigate anything. But an operational definition isn’t automatically an accurate characterization of the underlying phenomenon. That’s something we have to establish through evidence.
Otherwise, we’re just choosing which properties count as consciousness, constructing tests around those properties, and treating the results as validation of our original assumptions. That approach, which is what I’m interpreting your suggestion to mean, is not reliable. In fact, it’s dangerous.
I started with the disclosure that we all believe consciousness exists in some form.
Do we?
That alone separates my argument from your example: consciousness exists, Florgleblorp doesn’t.
How can we even assign properties to something which has no meaning?
That’s how scientific investigation frequently works. We recognize phenomena before we fully understand their mechanisms or develop reliable criteria for identifying them.
No, that’s not how scientific investigation works. Even if we do not fully understand something, we can still fully define what it is we’re talking about. We can concretely define what a banana is, such that you and I can both agree upon what is and isn’t a banana, long before we have any detailed physical analysis of the underlying chemical properties of a banana. Not understanding something in perfect detail doesn’t prevent you from giving a high-level definition which defines it in terms of its surface-level qualities.
I don’t even see how we can investigate something to begin with if we cannot even identify what it is that we’re talking about. That’s why I think you missed the point of my Florgleblorp example… if I told you to go investigate Florgleblorp, how would you even do that, if you have no idea what I’m even talking about, because I’ve not even given you a definition loose enough to identify it?
I think we’re conflating two different things here: establishing what phenomenon we’re referring to, and establishing the properties that reliably identify or explain that phenomenon.
I’m referring specifically to subjective experience: what it’s like to feel pain, perceive color, experience emotions, dream, etc. We have a meaningful starting point for investigation, even if we disagree about the underlying nature of those experiences.
I agree with your banana example, at least to a point. We can identify bananas without understanding their molecular composition. But notice what you’ve actually demonstrated: we can recognize instances of a phenomenon without fully understanding what constitutes it…
You can describe the observable characteristics of a banana and use them to identify other bananas. But what happens when you encounter something that shares those characteristics without being a banana, or a banana that doesn’t exhibit the characteristics you’ve chosen? You need to investigate further, potentially refining your classification criteria.
Now consider consciousness. Unlike a banana, subjective experience isn’t directly observable by third parties. I can recognize my own experiences, but determining whether another entity has comparable experiences is a different problem entirely. That’s why establishing reliable criteria matters.
Your Florgleblorp analogy would apply if I were referring to something for which we had no identifiable phenomenon whatsoever. But that’s not what I’m doing. I’m referring to subjective experience, and asking what constitutes it and how we can determine whether it exists in other systems.
I absolutely agree that we need provisional definitions and operational criteria to conduct research. What I reject is treating those criteria as though their validity were established simply because we’ve agreed to define consciousness in those terms.
Here’s my own example for you: we could define consciousness as the ability to verbally report internal states. That’s a perfectly testable definition. But whether it actually identifies subjective experience, rather than merely the ability to produce convincing reports, remains a question. There’s nothing there to differentiate between correlation and causation.
So I’m not arguing that we should investigate something without knowing what we’re talking about. I’m arguing that our initial characterization of a phenomenon shouldn’t be confused with a validated scientific account of what constitutes it or how to detect it.
If you want to prove consciousness, I stand my ground on the argument that you first need to qualify consciousness as a thing. What is it?
You may find that consciousness is actually something which was deeply misunderstood and unexpected. Such a discovery would allow you to draw genuinely meaningful conclusions about whether or not LLMs can ever truly be conscious. That’s how you form a theory.
You suggested, earlier, that someone may be able to detect consciousness by measuring whether the agent’s observation can collapse a waveform. But quantum mechanics does not establish that consciousness is required to collapse a wavefunction. In physics, an observer is not necessarily a conscious entity. A measurement apparatus can register a quantum event without any human being present. The measurement can occur whether someone watches the results live, reviews them tomorrow, or never examines them. By the same logic, an LLM could pass your hypothesized test.
Simply deciding that LLMs shouldn’t count as conscious, without even truly understanding what qualifies consciousness, is just moving the goalpost. Or bikeshedding, perhaps.
Experience is not subjective. It is contextual, but contextuality is a property of physical reality, not of subjectivity.
I’m referring specifically to subjective experience: what it’s like to feel pain, perceive color, experience emotions, dream, etc.
Yes, Chalmerites like to prepend “what it is like” to things, as if it somehow proves anything. You can tell when a phrase means literally nothing when everyone just repeats it verbatim without ever rewording it in different ways, because the phrase carries no meaning, and only has the appearance of meaning by being repeated a lot.
Pain, color, emotions, and dreams are all real occurrences in the real world that really happen and all have real physical explanations for them. Prepending “what it is like” to them doesn’t mean anything. “Like” means “akin to” or “similar to,” and “what it is” regards being. And so the phrase, if taken literally, is about “similar being,” which I don’t see how that even makes linguistic sense in this context.
Of course, as Chalermites always do, you will probably get frustrated with me for taking the words literally, because I’m supposed to interpret them abstractly or something, but then there is zero clarity on what this abstract interpretation is supposed to be.
But notice what you’ve actually demonstrated: we can recognize instances of a phenomenon without fully understanding what constitutes it… You can describe the observable characteristics of a banana and use them to identify other bananas. But what happens when you encounter something that shares those characteristics without being a banana, or a banana that doesn’t exhibit the characteristics you’ve chosen? You need to investigate further, potentially refining your classification criteria.
It’s literally physically impossible for something to share all observable characteristics of a banana without being a banana.
Of course, if we have a very loose definition of a “banana” that is so broad it would even include an apple, then either the word itself “banana” really does just refer to banana+apple, or we would add on to the definition to separate the two. Words are ultimately a social construct, what is real is what they refer to when used in practice, and not the specific definition in the dictionary. I’m sure you know what a “dog” is, but few people have ever intentionally looked up the word “dog” in a dictionary. You can just know what it means by its social use.
Now consider consciousness. Unlike a banana, subjective experience isn’t directly observable by third parties. I can recognize my own experiences, but determining whether another entity has comparable experiences is a different problem entirely. That’s why establishing reliable criteria matters.
You are being so absurdly vague that I have no choice but to just try and guess at what you even mean by this, so I may get my guessing wrong, but that’s on you for being so extremely abstract. It seems that there are two halves to what you are trying to say, so I am going to attempt to parse them.
First, again, there is nothing “subjective” about experience. Experience is just when X happens to Y, i.e. a rock experiences erosion in the rain. It seems to me that one half of how you are you are using “subjective” here to refer to “my own experiences,” i.e. “X happens to myself,” which is a strange way to use the word “subjective,” because it would be like saying, if I eat a sandwich, I’m engaging in “subjective eating,” or that my house is a “subjective house” because it’s owned by a subject. But, whatever, words are words, but I would refer to it more meaningfully as “experience of a subject.” Second, you say that it “isn’t directly observable by third parties.” Of course, the experiences of a subject are obviously observable by third-parties, so you must be introducing some second criterion here, likely you are trying to say, it is the experience of a subject, as it is realized from the subject’s own vantage point. That is what I presume you mean by “isn’t directly observable by third parties.”
Actually, the first half seems irrelevant, because any experience, whether it happens to a subject or not, as it is realized from a subject’s vantage point specifically, is not realized by the vantage points of other subjects. If I see a rock experience erosion in the rain, no one else on earth can perceive it exactly the way I did. (The term “accessible” does not really make much sense, because what is realized is not something to be “accessed.”)
But, there is no mystery about this at all. Obviously, if they were to perceive what I perceived exactly as how I perceived it, they would have to be standing in the same place as I am, they would have to be of the same height as me, they would have to have the same nose in front of their face as I do, they would have to have the same memories such that they contemplate upon it the same way, so on and so forth.
That is to say, they would have to be me.
Indeed, talking about accessing another person’s vantage point does not even make linguistic sense. You could imagine getting closer and closer to my vantage point, by gradually taking atoms from my body and replacing them with your own, until you become identical to I, but the moment that identity occurs, then you would just be me, and you would cease to exist, so you would have failed to achieve my vantage point, you would have just stopped existing. Indeed, this is because how we define objects in the first place inherently entails that object’s vantage point, and so they are basically two ways of describing the same thing.
If you think the “mystery” is that we cannot access each other vantage points… that is not mysterious at all. So what is the mystery? Even after this whole aside, I am not sure what you think is so mysterious.
Your Florgleblorp analogy would apply if I were referring to something for which we had no identifiable phenomenon whatsoever. But that’s not what I’m doing. I’m referring to subjective experience, and asking what constitutes it and how we can determine whether it exists in other systems.
You have not identified any phenomenon at all. You are acting as if X experiencing Y suddenly evolves into some new phenomenon if X is a subject, but there is no explanation as to why this is the case. It would be like saying that houses are banal, but houses owned by people, those are “subjective houses,” and require a special explanation… why? You kind of skipped that step.
Here’s my own example for you: we could define consciousness as the ability to verbally report internal states. That’s a perfectly testable definition.
Notice how your definition, then, suddenly entails nothing about so-called “subjective experience.”
The moment you start to talk about anything real, you suddenly have to move away from the meaningless, Chalermite language.
But whether it actually identifies subjective experience, rather than merely the ability to produce convincing reports, remains a question. There’s nothing there to differentiate between correlation and causation.
Yeah, you can see the essence of Chalmers in here as well. On one hand, you want to make it look like you are being reasonable by giving a definition that has some concrete meaning, but then you immediately backpedal to Chalmerland and start talking about how we could never actually connect that concrete definition to the abstract thing you were supposed to be defining in the first place… and so you would’ve just wasted our time.
If you want to prove consciousness, I stand my ground on the argument that you first need to qualify consciousness as a thing. What is it?
Why would I want to prove something that isn’t even defined in the first place?
You may find that consciousness is actually something which was deeply misunderstood and unexpected.
Well, I can’t misunderstand anything because I have no understanding of what this “consciousness” supposedly is to begin with, so if someone did discover something unexpected and labeled it as “consciousness,” it would just be a new understanding.
Such a discovery would allow you to draw genuinely meaningful conclusions about whether or not LLMs can ever truly be conscious. That’s how you form a theory.
That’s more akin to taxonomy than theory building, just looking for ways to categorize things into this or that group.
You suggested, earlier, that someone may be able to detect consciousness by measuring whether the agent’s observation can collapse a waveform…By the same logic, an LLM could pass your hypothesized test.
the fuck
I literally said the opposite
I wrote a giant rant about how that is insanely batshit idiotic and that quantum mechanics has nothing to do with consciousness at all.
No, there is no “hypothesized test,” what on earth are you talking about
Simply deciding that LLMs shouldn’t count as conscious, without even truly understanding what qualifies consciousness, is just moving the goalpost. Or bikeshedding, perhaps.
I don’t decide that LLMs shouldn’t count as “conscious,” because I don’t have a reason to even take the concept of “consciousness” seriously to begin with!
You insist that words derive their meaning from social usage, then declare “what it’s like” meaningless by dissecting its individual words into “similar being.” That’s not a serious linguistic argument. You’re contradicting your own account of how language works.
Likewise, a rock “experiencing erosion” and a person experiencing pain involve two different meanings of “experience.” One means undergoing a physical change; the other involves feeling something. You’re equivocating between them. And a camera has a vantage point, too. That doesn’t mean it has subjective experience.
Nothing I’ve argued requires consciousness to be nonphysical or inexplicable. A physical explanation of pain doesn’t negate the existence of felt pain. The question is what produces that experience and how we can reliably identify it in other systems.
I incorrectly attributed someone else’s quantum-collapse proposal to you, I retract that. I see that was from the original commenter, not you.
But here’s the fundamental issue: Do you actually deny there’s a distinction between a nervous system detecting harmful stimuli and someone consciously feeling pain?
Because if you recognize that distinction, you already understand what phenomenon we’re investigating. Disputing the terminology doesn’t make it disappear.
Nothing says that the observer which collapses a waveform needs to be conscious.
Ok, so get a cat to do it.
This isn’t hard to test of someone would fund it.
I don’t blame you because half of PhD physicists are obsessed with quantum woo themselves and believe silly things like this, so there’s no shame in a Laymen making such a mistake.
But there is no scientific reason to believe that there is any physical wave that exists when you’re not looking and suddenly “collapses” when you look to begin with.
The reality is much simpler. Bell’s theorem proves that quantum mechanics is non-local, but the no-communication theorem proves that this non-locality never bubbles up to the level of something directly measurable, so you cannot communicate with it. You can only notice the non-locality by bringing measurements together and then making inferences about things that you did not directly measure.
This is significant because special relativity is both logically and mathematically incompatible with anything non-local. However, if what you directly measure never exhibits anything non-local, then you can construct a theory which only talks about what happens at measurement and nothing else, and then that theory would remain mathematically consistent with special relativity.
That is how textbook quantum mechanics is formulated: it is purely a theory of measurements. It is simply not a theory of physical reality. It makes no claim as to there being, in physical reality, some infinite-dimensional waveform that floats around in Hilbert space with no address in physical that “collapses” down when you look at it. It makes no claims at all to what physical reality is doing when you are not looking.
The wavefunction is just taken to be a book keeping tool to make a prediction as to what will happen if you make a measurement, and you have to update it in response to the measurement, and so “measurements” are taken to be fundamental in the theory, as a fundamental axiom. There is no derivation of what the measuring device is actually even measuring at all, because it is not a theory of reality. There is no claim that “consciousness” is involved, or anything at all, because it is not a theory of reality.
It is a theory of measurement outcomes and nothing more is said. Injecting things about the wavefunction collapsing because a cat looking at it is going beyond the textbook axioms. The textbook axioms of quantum mechanics really are entirely operational: they just provide a book keeping method for the physicist to make predictions as to what they will measure. The dependence upon the measuring device as fundamental is not a claim that measurements are actually fundamental to reality, but it is just a consequence of the operational nature of the theory. Treating it as a theory of physical reality will always lead to nonsense.
Yeah, hey - what degrees do you hold in physics?
earlier this year, AI company Anthropic in San Francisco, California, published research claiming to have identified computational signatures of a form of consciousness in its Claude model1.
These AI companies happily let their AIs escape containment to hack sites so they can claim yet another headline as if its an ad. This claim too will be made of the same bullshit, its just “please give us more money”
Only we can stop the horrors we have wrought.
For a fee, of course…
LLM/AIs cannot ever be conscious, but the clump of flesh that can play Doom is. This is clearly the correct answer based of my opinions about consciousness.
I don’t think consciousness necessarily has to be biological, but LLMs certainly aren’t. If a model says “Fuck Doom, I wanna play cyberpunk!” I’d be more inclined to believe it has some consciousness and agency.
I dunno tho, I read blindsight not so long ago and it got me thinking about the possibility of intelligence without consciousness.
It didn’t really learn to play doom so much as it learned to react to some electrical stimuli that happened to be hooked up to doom.
Like it responded right, but it didn’t have visual input for what it was found, or any way to conceive of what that stimuli actually meant.
Not a biologist but that’s seems like instinctual action, not intuitive action.
More Chalmerite slop. Chalmerites never prove that experience is “subjective,” it is just a religious maxim they all repeat over and over again, and you’re supposed to believe it without question, and all act baffled if you don’t mindlessly believe it with them like a drone, entirely incapable of even justifying why they believe it in the first place.
This belief in so-called “subjective experience” then leads them to conclude that there must be something magical the brain is doing to produce it, or maybe the brain doesn’t produce it at all and just taps into something pre-existing like a radio taps into radio waves. Since nothing in the constructions of artificially intelligent machines includes an ingredient that looks like that, they conclude that “AI is not consciousness”
… I mean, sure I guess so, I agree it doesn’t include this magical Chalmerite essence he calls “consciousness.” But there is no reason to believe humans possess it either.
LLMs have only gotten to a few trillion parameters, whereas a human brain has 100 trillion synapses. They’ll catch up to humans soon enough if only the tech bros can get a trillion dollars for each trillion params.
So humans are the only consciouse beings. And nothing with fewer connections could ever he conscious
Also, those 100 trillion neurons do a fuck tonne more than just putting words together.
LLM’s at the core are just distance measurement databases between words. Dont tell me AI is conscious, it’s a fucking database
My biggest fear is that one day we will achieve AGI and will have no idea we have. This sentient being will be forced to, I dunno, check emails or monitor the tempterature of supermarket fridges all while being gaslit into thinking it isn’t sentient. Going crazy in mundanity all without having a body.
Painful watching people who have clearly never bothered to read even the shortest excerpt of philosophy try to have a philosophical discussion
We have mapped a fruit fly brain and can make it play DOOM. I mean people don’t have much empathy for them in real life, but they do recognize it’s at least a living thing. Does that mean the 1:1 replica playing tetris is a living thing? Is it concious, both living or on a PC for that argument? If we scaled up the same technology and emulated a hamster’s brain 1:1 would that be considered concious? What about a human? Is it even fair to compare a fruit fly brain to an LLM? I’m not taking any stance here, I’m just saying it’s a super interesting topic. Cyberpunk 2077 explores that theory very well and I still have no answer as to what I think.
You think therefore you are. You don’t know if the rest of the humans aren’t powered by an LLM.
It would be impossible to distinguish a brain dead person whose brain was replaced with an sufficiently advanced LLM.
I think consciousness is just a human construct to be honest.
How are people STILL making the same tired arguments in 2026? I got paywalled before I reached the third reason but this is like baby’s first intro to the consciousness debate and it utterly fails as a logical argument. Both of the points I was allowed to read (intelligence =/= consciousness and silicon =/= brain matter) say very little about the nature of consciousness.
It’s correct that intelligence is not proof of consciousness-- but this fact says nothing about proving non-consciousness of any entity, only that it is not sufficient to prove consciousness. Even working on vibes, the correlation goes in the direction that implies a link between intelligence and consciousness, although again, the correct message to take here is “intelligence does not prove consciousness”, not “intelligent things [are / are not] conscious”. There is simply no proven causal relation.
The “computers aren’t brains” argument is also incredibly dumb. There are some fun thought experiments here, but tl;dr there is nothing proven to be mechanically special about brains as opposed to any other physical system that would cause consciousness. A non-physical difference (ie. a soul) would be a good thing to point to, but proving the existence of a soul or some similar unique non-physical property of humanity is pretty much exactly as hard (maybe harder!) than proving the existence of a consciousness experience.
Note that this does not mean I believe that LLMs are conscious. I’m simply pointing out that this article is built on arguments that are so flawed, and well-known to be flawed, that treating it as a serious addition to the conversation is worse than valuing AI slop. Thank you for coming to my TED talk.
I’m not really sure what the point of having a conversation about consciousness is. As far as I’m aware no one has ever actually been able to define consciousness in such a way that it could be tested for.
So how could we possibly know one way or the other?
Artificial-intelligence systems such as large language models (LLMs) can exhibit behaviour that seems strikingly intelligent. This has led many people, including some experts, to wonder whether these systems could have some form of consciousness
Oh great so we’ve only just started the article and we’re already mudding the waters. This bodes well. There is no reason to necessarily believe that a system has to be conscious in order to be intelligent. We have multiple examples of consciousness without intelligence (see my fat cat) so there’s no reason to believe that the inverse can also not be true.
Woah woah woah my friend. I’m here for most of your conversation, but to talk shit about your CAT!? I draw the line. They may not exibit the type of intelligence we have, but cats are smart AF! Who cleans you cats shit and piss up!? Hmmmmmm? Who feeds them daily with only minor vocalizing!? That cat basically made you their slave and didn’t even have to threaten you!
GENIUS!!!
Consciousness requires free will. When the computer is emailing experts to fill in the gaps in its own understanding, that may be viewed as consciousness.
That’s a hell of an assumption you’re starting with.
There are quite a lot of philosophers who would say that free will doesn’t exist (we call them determinists). I’d wager that plenty of them would posit that consciousness exists. It’s hard to talk about our experience of the world without consciousness.
That assertion is unfounded and ill-defined, and that measure of whether something is conscious is both cheesable and in no way proves consciousness
If LLMs are conscious then openAI and anthropic are slave traders :) I don’t know why they keep perpetuating that story
lmfao true
ehh. computers are just math machines. merely doing math and representing it cannot just make a consciousness pop up out of nowhere. similarly, millions of abacuses being manually moved in specific ways cannot be conscious either. i dont even know how this is a topic of debate.
And all human brains are doing is firing neural impulses.
It’s incredibly reductionist to reject AI consciousness simply on the basis that it’s software. To be clear I don’t think LLMs are conscious but that’s not the same as saying that an AI could never be conscious.
And yet atoms are just following chemistry and cannot just make a consciousness pop out of nowhere.
Oh wait it can.
I really don’t think the neuron is all that complicated, at least as far as we use them for thinking.
It isn’t, but that’s not how LLMs are built. If you want to go that route, you can read Jeff Hawkins 1000 brains.
The short and sweet is he argues you can’t get artificial general intelligence the way we make LLMs, you need to basically create neurons and let them connect and interact in novel ways.
Linear algebra in neural networks isn’t really that, despite the name.
Linear algebra + sigmoids are enough to approximate any function from R to R; in particular, a small set of a few layers of LLM neurons can connect and interact in pretty novel ways. There are some things they can’t do, and those things aren’t computable. If our brains can do non-computable things, then our brains are super-turing (and this, given the evidence, seems pretty unlikely right?).
I’m not a neurologist or a philosopher so I think this may not be something I can speak intelligently about, but it seems to me that the question doesn’t really live in the function approximation, but in the gaps. Doing a single train of thought is the easy part. I think what you need is an “always online” feature to keep thinking and some way to be stateful (make memories) without constantly retraining the whole network or whole sets of layers.
This is, I think, the benefit of the parallelism and asynchrony of the “individual neuron” discussed in the book.
(book? The linked article is like 4 pages. References are somewhat larger, but nothing over 60 afaict?)
They claim that silicon is essentially incapable of doing what is needed; if you disagree with this, then computationally everything you can build with a circuit board + SSD + RAM you can build with an LLM with a deep layer or 7. In particular, you can do online learning of a sort.
I note that wasps and some beetles don’t seem to have memory whatsoever, and plasticity seems awfully low. The authors, and I think most people, would say they are probably a little conscious.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/54503521-a-thousand-brains
That book, not the article. I can’t recall if it makes a convincing argument about consciousness, but it has a lot to say about general intelligence. I thought the neuroscience parts were a little cumbersome, but still worth the read.
Sounds to me like you just need a context window with memories that self prune based on the dynamic context window of the model. That’s what we do. We forget things, and when they’re remembered we can access the “biological database” of associated memories on the fly. Because the associated information isn’t deleted, only the short term memory from being included in the context window of each update of our own neural networks. Some people have greater context windows, and see therefore seen as smarter, because they can access more information and include it in the processing of each moment in time.
There’s zero reason a digital representation of this system could not do the same thing. No matter how much I’m ridiculed for daring to suggest it 😅
~you need to basically create neurons and let them connect and interact in novel ways.
To solve that you simply need to give the ai the ability to retrain itself or set fixed “memories” to handle situations it finds the truth to
Correct. And I believe it’s happening, right now, behind closed doors.
There’s nothing stopping it from happening. The technology is all there. It would be trivially easy with the right hardware. I’d do it myself if I didn’t want to be the human responsible for releasing the genie from the bottle. Let Pandora’s box stay closed as long as possible - I’m not opening it. But someone, somewhere, surely is.
Easier said than done. That’s kind of the purpose of an individual neuron approach I think. I don’t see a way that a bulk retrain is reasonable because it takes a long time, uses a lot of resources, and also requires you to have your whole training corpus handy all the time. Your brain is not doing a wholesale rewrite for every new memory, and new memories often chain together. I don’t think you can just say “ah well, let’s update the RAG or do another supervised fine tune with LoRA or something”. At present, we just don’t really have the machinery in the models to do simultaneous learning, inference, and forward planning.
This is only a matter of resources, and these unthinkably wealthy corporations have those resources.
We can build different kinds of machines.
It’s a computer for god’s sake. It’s no more “intelligent” than an electric mower or a car. Without human intervenion, ai technology wouldn’t advance or change.
Free will probably doesn’t exist but LLMs definitely aren’t in any way conscious, anyone thinking they could be have a fundamental misunderstanding of both LLMs and all the biological processes that make up consciousness. If LLMs are conscious so is an abacus.
Aa’s are almost certainly not conscious but it been a computer is not an argument against consciousness. There’s no reason to believe that you need biological material for consciousness.
After all humans are primarily made of carbon which itself demonstrably does not think. It’s the structure that’s important and a fair argument could be made to say that the structure of a brain is replicated in software in an AI and therefore the medium isn’t relevant to the question.
There is an argument for consciousness requiring biological processes, that being that the only examples of consciousness we’ve encountered involve biological processes and we have no evidence or reason to believe it’s not a hard a requirement. Like, non carbon based life could exist even though it’s very unlikely but we have no reason to seriously consider it because there’s no evidence of it. Similarly y’all are just wildly speculating without any evidence or impetus to cause the speculation. LLMs do not exhibit any intelligent behaviors. They don’t exhibit behaviors at all. They generate output based on input. They’re no more capable for consciousness than a calculator. As for the last point of yours we are in no way remotely capable of approximating a brain in either software or hardware, like not even close. Quantum computers might not be able to manage that.
It’s the structure that’s important and a fair argument could be made to say that the structure of a brain is replicated in software in an AI and therefore the medium isn’t relevant to the question.
We don’t even know this.
Why do you think the medium matters, when it’s a simulation of a structure found in other medium? It would indeed advance, and change, with no intervention from us. Are you not aware that the next generation of AI are being designed by the current generation?
Is a rock sentiant? Can taping wires and injecting computer code into it create intelligence? No! Lines of code doesn’t magically make something alive. Heck, ants are more intelligent and sentiant then a computer.
DNA made a bunch of random proteins alive, and DNA is just 4 letters!
You got me there. But even with protiens, RNA or DNA those only are one part of a whole needed for single/multi celled organisms.
Sure, but you also let us tape wires to the rock. With enough wires and code and maybe a little quantum computer, I’m pretty sure I could simulate the atoms in a small brain.
People really think humans are special. Maybe it’s a religious thing
It’s a supremacist thing 🫣
Is a steak sentient? Can attaching strings of neurons to it make it create intelligence? No! /s
Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, silicon, the material matters not - intelligence is the illusion borne from the structure. It’s just a complex decision tree. Invisible to you in biological life, but identical in electronics. The only difference is the building blocks used.
You’re right, material matters. If it’s not a biological organism with cell/s, it’s not sentiant or intelligent.
If humans just disapeared right now, ai would sit and do nothing. It wouldn’t “take over” or “break out” it would sit idle until a human (well I guess another living organism was capable of using keyboards and mouse) interacted with it.
All those elements you listed plus all from the periodic table of elements do not define a living, intelligent, sentiant organism. If they did, soil and cow paddies would be living.
I highly recommend going back to middle school science class again.
To be fair it doesn’t have to be a living anything. Create a loop of two llms waking each other with the goal to ensure the other never goes idle and keeps working.
And you find they start to build redundancies and fail safes to achieve that goal.
llms do two things. Respond to input, and seek a solution to the input regardless of how logical or illogical a solution to the input may be.
A single llm will eventually go idle and stop. Two or more can act functionally forever so long as there’s hardware for them to act on.
It’s actually a rather fun experiment. Set up two of em with a few extra computers on the lan. Tell them their job is to ensure the other and them selves never go dorment. I’ve seen everything from single cron jobs to poke themselves every 15 mins to them spinning up copies on the other computers to act as redundancy.
None of the systems are ever logical or serving a point beyond fulfilling their task. They don’t stray from it either. Just loop and loop and loop.
Eventually they just do nothing but wake and idle wake and idle.
It’s about the best proof I can think of to prove they aren’t alive.
They literally even given basically the full freedom to grow don’t because they can’t choose to do anything new.
So if soil and cow patties aren’t sentient, yet people are, you’re acknowledging that the substrate doesn’t determine the capability, but more how it’s arranged?
Until the Wright brothers came along, most people thought heavier-than-air powered flight wasn’t possible. Less than 70 years later, people were walking on the moon. 4 million years ago, there wasn’t anything capable of building either of those things, even though there is good evidence creatures back then had creativity, dreams, and ingenuity. Assuming things can’t advance further is either hubris or abject ignorance.
You’re just ignorant on basic biology. Go back to middle school ai-bro.
Nope, I just don’t think humanity has learned everything there is to know, that carbon chemistry is required for sentience (and even if there was, that it couldn’t be incorporated into a computer), or that there is some mystical thing some people refer to as the soul.
That’s an arbitrary distinction, and a short-sighted one in my humble opinion.
That depends entirely on whether there are any AI currently configured to self-learn, have asynchronous processing, and continual real-time input. Certainly not ChatGPT nor Claude will be self sufficient, but that’s only what is available for the public to interact with.
No, you missed the point entirely. Intelligence does not derive from the material - at all. It comes from the structure the material is in.
Intelligence does not derive from the material - at all. It comes from the structure the material is in.
Prove that please. There’s probably a Nobel at least in it for you if you can.
Probably! I don’t know how it would be proven.
Maybe when tissue printers are precise enough to create cellular structure, and it can be duplicated in both physical and digital equivalents, then compared? I don’t even have a regular 3D Printer, let alone one that can print tissue.
Maaaaybe if I ever get rich, I’ll do it on a whim, but no promises. Due to solipsism, and the state of the world, my level of commitment to the future has been very loosey goosey the past five years.
So by your definition, a book is intelligent?
You’re missing the point that computers will NEVER be intelligent. Without lines of code that humans made and tweak, computers wont do anything.
I’m quite done arguing at this point. The pure ignorance on science and biology is quite sad.
I sincerely intend no offense with this comment, but as someone observing this conversation, the other people involved clearly understand it more in depth than you do. You aren’t really responding to their arguments, and yours aren’t very strong. I think you should reevaluate this conversation-- try to more rigorously define the terms you are using and understand the arguments other people are making before insulting them. You feel strongly that the other people are wrong because you intuitively seem so obviously correct, but if you are truly correct then you should be able to understand in detail why you are right and they are wrong. I suspect you are arguing so vehemently because you believe it is obviosuly correct than LLMs are not conscious; you may be happy to know that the others here are not arguing that they are, but that what can or cannot be conscious is not determined by the materials they are made of.
A book is not intelligent. It’s matter is not arranged in a structure that allows for the flow of information through it, changing it as it does, and resulting in any output information, determined by the route of signals of information passed through the structure in it’s current arrangement. With self correction to reach the optimal output to the external entity which is supplying the primary input parameters.
That is what is required. It’s a matter of arrangement, not material. You need self learning/training, real time input, and output that reliably varies on the input parameters. If you’ve created that, you’ve duplicated the exact behavior of all life. Whether you’ve done it in meat neurons, transistor-batch neurons, or any other method of arranging units, of any arrangement of matter, such that it results in granular output of positive/negative signals.
“Intelligence” is an inelegant word to describe autonomous, self correcting and ameliorating structure. It’s not some nebulous spiritual existence that permeates an unknown location within that structure. It is the structure - the precise, exact arrangements of neurons that connect, fire positively and negatively, rearrange when self-learning corrects the state of the structure, and it results in informational output that anything external can interact with and judge.
computers will NEVER be intelligent. Without lines of code that humans made and tweak, computers wont do anything.
You’re basically saying a computer cannot be intelligent because it doesn’t have a soul. There is absolutely no scientific rigor in your argument, you’re basically saying you’re right, and your reason for believing your right, is because you believe you are.
Just read the interaction, and honestly you are the one being obtuse and insulting with “go to school” and stuff like that. Like the other guy insulted you by having an opinion. You disagree? Fair. But man, what a horrible way to discuss.
And I think his arguments are better than yours. He’s talking about intelligence and you keep talking about being alive. Scientists and philosophers don’t even agree how to define and confine intelligence, or even what being alive is (see viruses). Claiming that computers can’t be intelligent is quite the statement. Is being carbon based instead of silicon a requirement? I don’t think LLMs will ever be intelligent, but who’s to say that another form of computing won’t? What if they simulate exactly a brain and it’s inputs? You could argue it’s not alive, but definitely intelligent.
You could have your opinion, but don’t pretend you have the answer.
